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Bankruptcy
by the Honorable John T. Laney, III *
and Victoria Barbino Grantham **
This year’s Bankruptcy Law Article surveys include both notable cases
and legislation that will have an impact on the practice of bankruptcy
law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.1 It
will address one Supreme Court of the United States case2 argued in
October 2020, which was decided early in 2021, and three Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals cases3 decided in 2020. This Article will also
include a follow up on the Small Business Reorganization Act of 20194
and a glimpse into the CARES Act,5 the most groundbreaking legislation
of its kind, and its provisions that directly and indirectly affect the
insolvency industry.
In a year not seen for a generation, the bankruptcy industry was
deeply affected by the economic shutdowns of 2020. Industries, such as
retail, suffered extraordinary hardships and sought relief through
Chapter 11 bankruptcies and creditor restructuring,6 and, overall,

* United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1964); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1966). Member,
Mercer Law Review (1964–1966); Co-Editor in Chief (1965–1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Career Law Clerk to the Honorable John T. Laney, III. University of Richmond (B.A.,
2015); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2020). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1 For a discussion on opinions from 2019 that impacted bankruptcy law, see John T.
Laney, III and Nicholas Greer, Bankruptcy, 2019 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71 MERCER L.
REV. 937 (2020).
2 City of Chi. v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021).
3 Law Sols. of Chi. LLC v. Corbett, 971 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2020); Whaley v. Guillen (In
re Guillen), 972 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2020); Feshbach v. Dep’t of Treasury IRS (In re
Feshbach), 974 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2020).
4 Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 116 P.L. 54, 133 Stat. 1079.
5 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 116 P.L. 136, 134 Stat. 281.
6 Tonya Garcia, Retail bankruptcies in 2020 hit the highest levels in more than a decade,
and experts say there are more to come, MarketWatch (Dec. 28, 2020, 1:25 PM),
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business bankruptcies reached their highest levels since 2013.7 Because
of the effect of Covid-19, however, aggregate bankruptcy filings,
including personal bankruptcies, decreased roughly thirty percent from
2019 to 2020.8 Bankruptcy professionals, and nearly everyone worldwide,
have faced a world with uncertainties, financial and otherwise, instigated
by this new virus.
I. NOTABLE CASES
A. Supreme Court Opinion: City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton9 Defines a
Violation of the Automatic Stay
On October 13, 2020, the Supreme Court heard arguments on City of
Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton after the arguments were postponed in April
due to COVID-19 restrictions.10 The case delved into the bounds of the
automatic stay in addressing rightful possession during a debtor's
bankruptcy.11 In this case, the City of Chicago impounded the cars of
three named Respondents, Robbin L. Fulton, George Peake, and Timothy
Shannon, as well as Jason Howard.12 Subsequently, they filed for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.13 The Respondents and City of Chicago
disagreed as to which entity should rightfully possess the vehicles.14
As Respondents, the Debtors argued, under § 362(a)15, the City of
Chicago's continued possession of the vehicles after the debtors' notice of
bankruptcy filings violated the automatic stay.16 The automatic stay
prohibits, “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/retail-bankruptcies-in-2020-hit-the-highest-levels-inmore-than-a-decade-and-experts-say-there-are-more-to-come-11608151350.
7 Ed Flynn, Weekly Bankruptcy Analysis December 14–20, 2020, ABI (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://abi-org.s3.amazonaws.com/Covid19/stats/Weekly_Update_Dec_14-20-2020.pdf.
8 Maria Chutchian, Chapter 11s soared, but overall bankruptcies hit historic low in 2020,
Westlaw News (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/bankruptcy-2020stats/chapter-11s-soared-but-overall-bankruptcies-hit-historic-low-in-2020idUSL1N2JG1SQ.
9 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021).
10 City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, SCOTUSBlog, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/city-of-chicago-illinois-v-fulton/.
11 Fulton, 208 L.Ed.2d at 387.
12 Brief for the Respondents at 10, Fulton, 208 L. Ed. 2d 384 (2021). (No. 19-357).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 20.
15 11 U.S.C. § 362.
16 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 28–31.

2021]

BANKRUPTCY

1031

estate[.]”17 The Seventh Circuit previously held that a creditor’s retention
of collateral repossessed pre-petition violates the automatic stay.18
In its response, the City of Chicago as Petitioner first addressed
§ 362(a)(3), stating the statute’s text does not require a creditor in lawful
possession of property to surrender it to a debtor in bankruptcy.19 Then,
the Petitioner argued that § 542(a)20 controls.21 Section § 542(a) reads,
“an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control,
during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell . . . shall
deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such
property[.]”22 The City claimed that the property should be transferred to
the Trustee, not to the debtors.23 However, the City also argued that the
transfer of property to the trustee is not, “self-executing,” triggered only
by the filing of a petition.24 The City agreed to transfer the property after
the Trustee demonstrated that the requirements of § 542(a) are met, and
the possessing creditor has no defenses to turnover.25
On January 14, 2021, the Court ruled unanimously that the, “mere
retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does
not violate § 362(a)(3).”26 The Court held that the automatic stay
prohibits, “affirmative acts” that would “disturb the status quo of [the]
estate[,]” but an act, “implies . . . something more” than continued
possession of already held property. 27 The Court added that this
interpretation creates a “[more] natural reading” of the relationship
between § 362(a)(3) and § 542(a): § 362(a)(3), “prohibits collection efforts
outside the bankruptcy proceeding that would change the status quo”
and § 542(a), “works within the bankruptcy process to draw far-flung
estate property back into the hands of the debtor or trustee.”28

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
Thompson v. GMAC, LLC, 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit also
accepted this understanding of § 362(a)(3) in Rozier v. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re
Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
19 Brief for the Petitioners at 5, City of Chi, Illinois v. Fulton, 208 L. Ed. 2d 384 (2021)
(No. 19-357).
20 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
21 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 11, at 7–8.
22 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
23 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 11, at 48–49.
24 Id. at 53.
25 Id. at 50.
26 Fulton, 208 L. Ed. 2d at 391.
27 Id. at 387, 389.
28 Id. at 387, 390.
17
18
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B. Eleventh Circuit Opinions
The Eleventh Circuit issued three bankruptcy opinions this year: Law
Solutions of Chicago, LLC v. Corbett, Whaley v. Guillen (In re Guillen),
and In re Feshbach.
!. Law Solutions of Chicago, LLC v. Corbett Affirms the
Bankruptcy Court's Power to Sanction
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction
and sanctioning power in Law Solutions of Chicago, LLC v. Corbett. Law
Solutions of Chicago LLC and UpRight Law LLC joined to create “The
UpRight Law Firm” (UpRight), an internet-based debt relief agency
based in Chicago.29 It operates by referring consumer bankruptcy cases
to a national network of local lawyers who represent the debtors in
bankruptcy courts.30 The contract that a debtor signs for representation
comes directly from UpRight Law Firm, not the local attorneys.31
In April 2016, the Bankruptcy Administrator (“BA”) for the Northern
District of Alabama filed two adversary proceedings regarding UpRight’s
involvement in a repossession scheme that deprived creditors of secured
collateral.32 The BA and UpRight settled the cases in October, presenting
the bankruptcy court with a settlement agreement.33 At the time, the
UpRight contract for the clients in the Northern District of Alabama
included a provision that limited the services UpRight would provide for
its clients included in the “flat fee” paid by the debtor to UpRight; other
services that exceeded the contractual bounds were excluded from the
representation or would cost the debtor more. The settlement agreement
between the BA and UpRight included a provision that stated UpRight
could no longer use the service-limiting language in its contract with
clients in the Northern District of Alabama. The bankruptcy court,
without reiterating the settlement agreement’s contents, signed an order
approving the agreement.34
Roughly seven months after the settlement agreement and subsequent
court approval, the BA audited UpRight’s cases and found three open
cases in which UpRight used the old contractual language, in violation of

Corbett, 971 F.3d at 1304.
Id. at 1306.
31 See id. The bankruptcy court found UpRight, not the local attorney “partner,”
responsible for the wording of the firm’s “Retention Agreements.”
32 Id. at 1307.
33 Id. at 1307–08.
34 Id. at 1308.
29
30
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the settlement agreement between the BA and UpRight.35 The BA filed
a motion to examine, which the court heard in July 2017.36 During the
hearing, the BA asserted that UpRight violated § 707,37 § 526,38 and Rule
2016,39 and UpRight admitted it made mistakes in the three cases.40 The
BA also made the court aware of three additional closed cases in which
UpRight had used the old contractual language. At the end of the
hearing, the bankruptcy court remarked that more testimony and review
was needed to determine whether UpRight violated the settlement
agreement and the proper recourse if so.41 The bankruptcy court entered
an “Order to Appear and Show Cause” and scheduled an evidentiary
hearing.42
During the evidentiary hearing, the BA put forth evidence that
UpRight used contractual language that violated the settlement
agreement in at least six cases. UpRight’s representative testified that it
made mistakes in the contested filings and, in those cases, UpRight did
not charge the debtors for additional services; however, UpRight also
admitted that the debtors had not asked for those services and, if they
had, UpRight would have charged the debtors extra for those services.43
After the hearing, the BA and UpRight briefed the issues, including
whether UpRight had violated §§ 526 and 707.44
The bankruptcy court determined that UpRight violated Rule 901145,
and §§ 526 and 707.46 It imposed sanctions of $150,000 and suspended
UpRight’s ability to file cases in the Northern District of Alabama for
eighteen months.47 UpRight appealed to the district court, and the
district court affirmed. UpRight then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.48

Id. at 1308–09.
Id. at 1309.
37 11 U.S.C. § 707.
3811 U.S.C. § 526.
39 USC Bankruptcy R 2016. Rule 2016 requires attorneys file detailed disclosure
documents when applying for compensation.
40 Law Sols. of Chi. LLC, 971 F.3d at 1309.
41 Id. at 1310.
42 Id. at 1310–11.
43 Id. at 1311.
44 Id. at 1313.
45 USC Bankruptcy R 9011.
46 Corbett, 971 F.3d at 1314.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1304.
35
36
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The Eleventh Circuit first addressed whether the bankruptcy court
had the authority to impose sanctions under § 526(a)(2).49 Section
526(a)(2) prohibits debt relief agencies from making statements in
bankruptcy courts that they know or should have known were untrue or
misleading.50 The bankruptcy court can impose sanctions if it finds the
agency violated § 526(a)(2) or, “engaged in a ‘clear and consistent pattern
or practice’ of doing so[.]”51 The Eleventh Circuit found the language used
in the contracts with clients, which allowed UpRight to charge for
additional services, misleading and in violation of § 526(a)(2).52
UpRight argued that the bankruptcy court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to impose sanctions. UpRight posited that the bankruptcy
court sanctioned UpRight for three closed cases and, because the cases
were not reopened, the court had no jurisdiction over the cases.53 The
Eleventh Circuit quickly disposed of that argument, stating a court’s
jurisdiction to sanction does not end when a case is closed.54
UpRight also claimed that because the bankruptcy court’s order did
not expressly incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement, the
court could not enforce the agreement.55 UpRight relied on Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,56 which found that an order
approving a settlement is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement.57 However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court relied on Rule 9011 and §§ 526 and 707 of the Bankruptcy Code to
impose sanctions, providing the bankruptcy court independent grounds
for jurisdiction.58 Further, the Eleventh Circuit added that the
settlement agreement and order were drafted to comply with the federal
Bankruptcy Code and rules and affected UpRight’s filings in the
bankruptcy court upon the settlement agreement’s effectuation.59
Therefore, the bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction to address
UpRight’s future filings, including the prohibition of such filings, in its
court.

Id. at 1315.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1315–16.
53 Id. at 1316.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1317.
56 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
57 Corbett, 971 F.3d at 1317.
58 Id.
59 Id.
49
50
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UpRight argued that the bankruptcy court violated its due process
rights when imposing sanctions under §§ 526 and 707 and Rule 2016
because UpRight was not given notice that “those particular sources were
in play.”60 Upright contended that the Order to Show Cause and
evidentiary hearing only addressed sanctions for violating the settlement
agreement and not statutory sanctions.61 However, transcripts from the
evidentiary hearing include references to §§ 526 and 707 as well as Rule
2016.62 Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted five different times in the
proceedings that the BA or the bankruptcy court provided UpRight notice
of the potential for statutory sanctions.63
UpRight then claimed that the bankruptcy court used the wrong
standard in imposing sanctions.64 Because the suspension had already
run at the time of arguments, the court dismissed this argument as
moot.65
Lastly, UpRight argued that its errors were inadvertent, and the
sanctions imposed were “grossly excessive.”66 While the Eleventh Circuit
stated the bankruptcy court’s condemnations of UpRight as “strong,” the
court believed, “serious sanctions were appropriate” based on UpRight's
conduct.67
2. Whaley v. Guillen (In re Guillen) and the Bounds of
Modification Under § 1329
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a question of first impression
regarding the circumstances in which modification is permitted by
§ 1329.68 The court heard this appeal directly from the bankruptcy court,
given the current circuit split stemming from this question.69 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that § 1329 does not
require a change of circumstances for the court to grant modification.70
This case arose when Rachel Capeloto Guillen, the debtor, moved for
the bankruptcy court’s permission to modify her Chapter 13 plan. Guillen
Id. at 1318.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1319.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1320.
67 Id.
68 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
69 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1223.
70 Id. at 1223–24.
60
61
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had two secured creditors in this case and commenced an action against
one of the secured creditors to avoid its lien. The parties entered into a
consent judgment agreeing that the lien was not perfected and that the
creditor held an unsecured claim.71
The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the debtor’s original
Chapter 13 plan. The original plan called for $4,900 in attorney’s fees
plus approved fees incurred from the adversary proceeding.72 After
confirmation, the debtor’s counsel applied for $8,295 for post-petition
legal fees stemming from the adversary proceeding and filed a modified
Chapter 13 plan to address the new fees.73
Under § 1329(a), a Chapter 13 plan can be modified under four
circumstances: (1) increasing or reducing payments to a class of creditors
in the plan; (2) extending or reducing time to make payments; (3) altering
distributions to a creditor to account for payments made other than
under the plan; and (4) reducing the amounts to be paid under the plan
to account for the debtor's purchase of health insurance.74 The debtor’s
modified plan fell under § 1329(a)(1); she requested to reduce the
available funds for unsecured creditors from $20,172 to $11,877 to pay
the additional $8,295 in attorney's fees.75 The Chapter 13 Trustee for the
Northern District of Georgia (the “Trustee”) objected to modification
claiming the modification violated the best interests of the creditors’ test
in § 132576 and that res judicata barred the debtor’s modification.77 The
bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, finding that § 1329 creates an
exception to the finality of a plan and the proposed modified plan
complied with § 1329.78
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the relationship between res
judicata, § 1327, and § 1329.79 Section 1327 treats the confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan as a final judgment, preventing parties from relitigating
the issues necessarily decided during confirmation.80 However, § 1329
explicitly creates an exception to a plan’s finality if the modified plan
meets its statutory requirements.81 The Trustee argued that § 1329
Id. at 1224.
Id.
73 Id. at 1224–25.
74 Id. at 1225 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)–(4)).
75 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1225.
76 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
77 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1225.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1225–26.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1226.
71
72
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requires a change of circumstance for modification; otherwise,
modification disregards the finality of confirmation orders under
§ 1327.82 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.83
The court held that the language of § 1329 does not require a change
of circumstances to allow modification.84 The court determined
Congress’s omission of a requirement of a debtor's change of
circumstances within the statute itself was persuasive.85 The court cited
similar provisions elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, namely
§ 1127(b),86 where Congress included a requirement for a change in
circumstances for debtors in Chapter 11, and § 1127(e), where Congress
omitted the requirement for individual debtors in Chapter 11.87 Quoting
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.,88 the court stated,“‘[h]ad Congress intended
to ‘oblige individual debtors to show some change in circumstances before
modifying confirmed plans, ‘it presumably would have done so
expressly’—just as it did in § 1127(b).”89
The court then addressed its sister circuits’ interpretations of § 1329.90
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s
reading of § 1329.91 However, the Fourth Circuit in In re Arnold92
disagreed and held that res judicata barred modification without a
change in circumstance of the debtor's financial condition.93 The Fourth
Circuit feared debtors would overwhelm the system with modifications
after minor financial changes undermining the finality of
confirmations.94 The Eleventh Circuit addressed these concerns, stating
that it would not read policy into the statute where the statute was
clear.95 Further, the Eleventh Circuit added that the provisions of § 1329
provided safeguards from all debtors’ requesting frivolous

Id.
Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 11 U.S.C. § 1127.
87 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1227.
88 1327 S. Ct. 1664 (2017).
89 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677).
90 Id. at 1227–28.
91 Id. at 1228. See In re Witkowski 16 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Meza 467 F.3d
874, 877–78 (5th Cir. 2006); Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2000).
92 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1228. See Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240 (4th
Cir.1989).
93 In re Arnold, 869 F.2d at 243.
94 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1228 (citing In re Murphy, 474 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2007)).
95 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1228.
82
83
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modifications—only certain parties can request modification and only in
the specific listed circumstances: the modified plan must still comply
with §§ 1325(a), 96 1322(a),97 (b), and (c) and, under § 1329, the
bankruptcy court also has the discretion of whether plan modification is
appropriate in the circumstances, unlike confirmation required under
§ 1325.98
Finally, the court addressed the Trustee’s assertion that In re Hoggle99
already resolved this legal question.100 In Hoggle, the Court analyzed
§ 1322(b)(5) and its relationship to § 1329.101 In that case, the court
allowed three debtors to modify their Chapter 13 plans to cure
post-confirmation defaults saying, “Congress designed § 1329 to permit
modification of a plan due to changed circumstances of the debtor
unforeseen at the time of confirmation.”102 However, in Guillen, when
addressing Hoggle, the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that, while an
unforeseen change of circumstance does permit modification, the
modification under § 1329 is not limited to only those situations.103 The
court said:
When a bankruptcy court faces a modified plan that satisfies the
requirements of § 1329, it may properly consider whether there had
been some changes in circumstances when deciding whether to
confirm the plan as modified. But it is free to confirm the modified plan
even where it has not found any change of circumstance.104

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the circumstances of this
debtor and the parties’ interests were best suited by modification.105
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the Trustee’s assertion that
the bankruptcy court included the debtor’s attorney’s fees in the § 1325
best interest of the creditor’s calculation.106 The court held that the
96 11 U.S.C. § 1325. By using the wording “the court shall confirm a plan,” the court
interpreted 11 U.S.C. § 1325 to require courts to confirm a plan that meets the section’s
enumerated requirements.
97 11 U.S.C. § 1322.
98 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1228–29.
99 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 1994).
100 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1229.
101 In re Hoggle, 12 F.3d at 1010.
102 Id. at 1011.
103 In re Guillen, 972 F.3d at 1229.
104 Id. at 1229–30.
105 Id. at 1230.
106 Id.
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Trustee failed to address this contention in the initial brief and only in
the reply brief, waiving those claims for the court’s consideration.107
3. In re Feshbach: Misbehaved Debtors Cannot Evade the IRS
The Eleventh Circuit addressed § 523(a)(1)108 in this fact-intensive
case. This case arose from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case of Matthew and
Kathleen Feshbach.109 The bankruptcy court found that the Feshbachs
violated § 523(a)(1)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code,110 which exempts tax
debts from discharge when, “the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax.”111 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed.112
The court first laid out the case’s substantial factual background.
Matthew Feshbach worked as an investment professional and formerly
managed a hedge fund. In 1999, the Feshbachs incurred a tax liability of
$1,950,827 and did not submit payment with their return. In June 2001,
to settle their tax liability, the Feshbachs submitted an offer-incompromise to the IRS for about $1 million to settle what was owed,
offering to immediately pay $200,000, sell their home in Bellaire, Florida
and pay $300,000, and pay the remaining balance over the next five
years. Along with the offer-in-compromise, the Feshbachs included a
$200,000 payment.113 “Looking at the Feshbachs’ income and allowable
expenses, the IRS believed the offer was a non-starter.”114 The
documentation the Feshbachs submitted with their offer showed the
Feshbachs’, “collection potential was not only greater than their offer but
also greater than the entire debt.” The Feshbachs withdrew their offer
before it was rejected and agreed instead to make monthly payments of
$1,000 to the IRS during their negotiations.115
However, to make the original $200,000 payment, the Feshbachs had
to liquidate securities, which led to their incurrence of capital gains tax
included in their 2001 tax liability, totaling $3,245,839. Including
interest and their previous unpaid debt, the Feshbachs then owed over
$6 million to the IRS. The Feshbachs again approached the IRS with a

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 523.
109 In re Feshbach, 974 F.3d at 1323.
110 Id.
111 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).
112 In re Feshbach, 974 F.3d at 1323.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1324.
115 Id.
107
108
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second offer-in-compromise, offering $1.25 million—a higher dollar
amount, but a lower percentage of their tax liability covered. On their
Form 433-A, the financial disclosure document which accompanied their
offer, the Feshbachs claimed they earned roughly $180,000 annually; on
their 2002 tax return, the Feshbachs reported an income of $611,413 and
the following year earned $738,608.116 The Feshbachs also failed to sell
their Florida residence, a part of the original offer to the IRS.117 The IRS
rejected the Feshbachs’ offer, finding that the Feshbachs had the ability
to pay their tax liability fully and settlement was inappropriate.118
After two failed settlement offers, the Feshbachs approached the IRS
about creating an installment plan to pay off their liabilities. The IRS
conditionally agreed only if the Feshbachs first fully paid their 1999 tax
debt. After the Feshbachs paid two installments of $50,000 and took out
a loan to pay the rest of the 1999 tax, the IRS approved their installment
plan.119
The Feshbachs remained current on their installment plan from late
2005 until 2008 when they began missing payments. In September 2008,
the Feshbachs made a third offer-in-compromise of $120,000 for their
remaining $3.6 million debt. With this offer, their Form 433-A stated the
couple had a monthly income of $833 and their household expenses
totaled over $12,000. However, their tax return claimed an income of
$193,205. After fully investigating the Feshbachs’ financial position, the
IRS determined the Feshbachs were able to pay $15,000 per month. The
Feshbachs made four such payments but failed to make any beyond May
of 2011. The couple filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy soon after.120
In their Chapter 7 case, the Feshbachs initiated an adversary
proceeding against the IRS, claiming their 2001 tax liability was
dischargeable.121 The government claimed that the Feshbachs violated
§ 523(a)(1)(C) by willfully attempting to evade and defeat their tax
liability.122 The IRS relied on the Feshbachs reported income, actual
income, and spending habits. The government also argued that
Feshbachs purposefully lowballed the IRS to stall making payments.123

Id.
Id. 1324–25.
118 Id. at 1325.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1325–26.
123 Id. at 1326.
116
117
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The bankruptcy court held a bench trial and concluded that the
Feshbachs willfully attempted to evade or defeat their 2001 tax liability.
The court found that the Feshbachs’ lavish spending wrongfully inhibited
the Feshbachs from paying back their tax debts in full when they had the
capacity to do so. The court also found that the Feshbachs intentionally
used the settlement process to delay the IRS’s collection efforts while
willfully redirecting their funds to pay for their lavish lifestyle.124 The
court also asked the parties to brief whether a partial discharge of debts
would be appropriate if the Feshbachs could not repay their debts, but
later found that partial discharge is not allowed under 523(a)(1)(C).125
The Feshbachs appealed.126
The Eleventh Circuit first affirmed the bankruptcy court's
determination that the Feshbachs' debt was nondischargeable under
523(a)(1)(C).127 The Eleventh Circuit established a test for
dischargeability under § 523(a)(1)(C): the government must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the debtor engaged in affirmative acts
constituting a willful attempt to evade or defeat payment of taxes.128 To
demonstrate willfulness under § 523(a)(1)(C), the “government must
demonstrate that ‘(1) the debtor had a duty under the law, (2) the debtor
knew of that duty, and (3) the debtor voluntarily and intentionally
violated that duty.’”129 Holding that no facts at issue existed for the first
two prongs of the willfulness test, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
third criteria.130
The Feshbachs argued that the bankruptcy court erred in finding
their spending habits alone justified finding their conduct willful.131 The
Eleventh Circuit opted not to decide the issue because the evidence of the
Feshbachs’ other conduct, together with their spending, supported the
bankruptcy court’s conclusions.132 The court then addressed the
Feshbachs’ behavior in the offer-in-compromise process.133 First, the
Eleventh Circuit quickly noted that the offer-in-compromise process was
an important settlement tool and, by using that process, debtors can

Id.
Id. at 1326–27.
126 Id. at 1327.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1331. See In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389, 1396–97 (11th Cir. 2000).
129 In re Feshbach, 974 F.3d at 1237 (quoting In re Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1396).
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settle their cases with the IRS in a productive manner.134 However, the
court determined that the Feshbachs abused the offer-in-compromise
system by submitting offers that were, “inadequate and
unrealistic . . . given their income and spending” and, “they used the
offer-in-compromise process to delay their payment of taxes.”135 While
they had pending offers-in-compromise with the IRS, the Feshbachs paid
only $1,000 monthly to the IRS but continued spending on expensive
personal luxuries.136 The Feshbachs claimed the expenses were for
business, but the bankruptcy court found many expenses had no business
purpose.137
The court also addressed the disparity between the Feshbachs’ selfreported income on their Form 433-A and their actual income for those
years.138 IRS officials believed that the Feshbachs underreported their
income while the IRS considered their offers-to-compromise, especially
given bank records showing the Feshbachs unexplainedly deposited
$50,000 into their bank accounts monthly.139 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed, adding that individuals who had the reported income from their
Form 433-A would not continue to spend at the rate of the Feshbachs,
especially on luxuries such as, “the personal chef, the dining-out, [and]
the expensive private schooling.”140 The court noted, “after reporting an
income of $180,000 on a Form 433-A, the Feshbachs spent $1.5 million
on themselves.”141 And when they submitted their 2008 offer of
$120,000—just 3.3% of their total debt—the Feshbachs were spending,
“over $12,000 per month on household goods and services.”142 The
Feshbachs claimed the $180,000 income was based on their average
income of the past four years taking into account, “phantom income”
received in 1999 and 2001.143 However, the Feshbachs still made
$700,000 in income in 1998, meaning they would have to make, “less than
$20,000 over the next three years” to have an average income of
$180,000.144 Instead, the Feshbachs made over $13.5 million, leading the

Id. at 1328–29.
Id. at 1329.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1330.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
134
135

2021]

BANKRUPTCY

1043

Eleventh Circuit to dispute all their earnings were entirely, “phantom
income.”145
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed the mens rea element of
§ 523(a)(1)(C).146 The Feshbachs argued the bankruptcy court applied the
wrong standard, and the government had to prove that their spending
was directly undertaken in order to evade taxes.147 The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed.148 First, the court ruled that the bankruptcy court applied the
correct standard of civil willfulness.149 It held § 523(a)(1)(C), “requires
only a ‘voluntary, conscious, and intentional’ attempt to violate a known
duty to pay taxes,” not the Feshbachs’ preferred standard of criminal
fraudulent intent.150 Then, the court reviewed the bankruptcy court’s
finding that the Feshbachs met the civil willfulness standard for evidence
of the court’s clear error.151 In reviewing the bankruptcy court’s findings,
the Eleventh Circuit did not determine that the bankruptcy court
committed clear error.152 There was evidence that the bankruptcy court
appropriately reviewed the evidence and found the IRS’s arguments and
evidence more persuasive.153
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the bankruptcy court’s
finding that partial discharge is not available under § 523(a)(1)(C) but
declined to examine the issue.154 The Feshbachs earned more than double
their owed debt over the nine years in question, making partial
discharge, even if available, inappropriate.155
II. RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Legislation heavily impacted the insolvency industry in 2020 with the
enactment of the Small Business Reorganization Act (“SBRA”) and the
passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(“CARES” Act).

Id.
Id. at 1331.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. (quoting In re Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979, 984 (3d Cir. 1997)).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1331–32.
154 Id. at 1332.
155 Id.
145
146

1044

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

A. Small Business Reorganization Act
Congress passed SBRA at the end of 2019, which created subchapter
V of Chapter 11 for small businesses to reorganize.156 Small business
debtors could begin filing under subchapter V as of February 19, 2020.157
Congress primarily hoped SBRA would expedite the plan confirmation
timeline and reduce expenses for small business owners to take
advantage of the bankruptcy process.158 In 2020, over 1,300 subchapter
V cases were filed, including approximately 250 cases in the Eleventh
Circuit.159
These cases filed under subchapter V have met the Congressional
goals for SBRA’s implementation. As of September 2020, twenty percent
of the cases filed had plans confirmed, which is six times the rate of
confirmations for non-subchapter V cases filed in the same timeframe.160
Twenty of the subchapter V cases had plans confirmed within 120 days
of filing; comparatively, only ten non-subchapter V cases had plans
confirmed within 120 days over the past three years.161 Under SBRA,
subchapter V trustees are empowered to oversee the viability of plans
and negotiate with parties in an effort for cases to be resolved more
efficiently.162 Thus far, more than sixty percent of plan confirmations
were consensual, suggesting subchapter V trustees have addressed
disputes preconfirmation, avoiding additional time and court costs.163
B. The CARES Act
In its initial response to the coronavirus crisis, Congress passed the
CARES Act, which was signed into law on March 27, 2020.164 The CARES
Act includes provisions that increased the debt threshold for filing under
subchapter V, addressed changes to Chapter 7 and 13 debtors’
circumstances, and created the Payroll Protection Program (“PPP”)

For a more thorough analysis of the provisions of SBRA, see supra note 1 at 531.
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affecting current debtors in bankruptcy and the financial options for
considering filing.
1. Subchapter V Debt Threshold
As part of the CARES Act, Congress increased the availability of
subchapter V for small business debtors. Originally, in order to file for
subchapter V, businesses must have accumulated less than $2,725,625
in debt.165 Congress temporarily increased the debt ceiling for small
businesses to file under subchapter V to $7.5 million.166 However, if a
debtor had filed for Chapter 11 before March 27, 2020, and now qualified
for subchapter V, the debtor cannot convert its case.167 This temporary
increase is set to expire on March 27, 2022, without additional
Congressional action to extend.168
C. Consumer Bankruptcy Changes
The CARES Act also included specific provisions under Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 to ease the burden on consumer debtors. Under Chapter 7,
the calculation of a debtor's income excludes any federal stimulus
payments distributed to individuals because of the COVID-19
pandemic.169 In Chapter 13, a debtor's disposable income also excludes
those federal stimulus payments.170 The CARES Act also permits
Chapter 13 debtors who confirmed plans before March 27, 2020, to seek
plan modification if the debtor experienced a direct or indirect, “material
financial hardship” due to the pandemic.171 A modified plan can extend
payments to seven years after the initial payment under the debtor’s

165 Gary McIntosh et. al., CARES Act Temporarily Expands Bankruptcy Rules, WEAVER
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original plan became due.172 These protections sought to ease the burden
on individual consumer debtors and prevent pandemic-related defaults
in otherwise successful cases.
1. PPP Loans and Bankruptcy-related Litigation
The CARES Act also instituted the Payroll Protection Program, which
created loans for companies to use on rent, wages, utilities, etc.173
Congress granted the Small Business Administration (SBA) with the
power to grant these loans.174 The loans can be completely forgiven if the
company meets certain guidelines, such as maintaining their entire
workforce for the required time after the loan’s disbursement and proof
the loan was used for eligible expenses.175
In the CARES Act’s language and initial guidance from the SBA, no
mention was made as to whether businesses in bankruptcy could apply
for PPP loans.176 However, on April 24, 2020, the SBA released guidance
that barred debtors currently in bankruptcy from receiving PPP loans.177
In the Fifth Circuit, debtors barred from receiving funds through the
PPP challenged the SBA’s authority to discriminate against bankrupt
companies under § 525(a)178 of the Bankruptcy Code and claimed that the
SBA’s denial of the debtor’s loan violated the arbitrary and capricious
standard179 under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).180 In June, the Fifth Circuit
addressed an appeal from the bankruptcy court which had imposed a
preliminary injunction against the SBA that would require the SBA to

Id.
Office of Capital Access, Top-line Overview of First Draw PPP, U.S. SMALL
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grant PPP funding to a bankrupt company.181 The court sided with the
SBA and vacated the injunction because 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1)182
prohibits injunctive relief against the SBA.183 The court did not address
the debtor’s § 525(a) or 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) arguments.184
On December 22, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the same issue
and decided the case under administrative law. The court applied the
Chevron185 framework in addressing whether an administrative agency
overstepped its statutory authority.186 Chevron created a two-step
analysis to address agency overreach: whether Congress directly spoke
on the issue and whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is
reasonable.187 In addressing the first step, the court held that the CARES
Act directly folded the PPP program into the SBA’s previously existing
statutory authority and explicitly gave the SBA emergency authority to
issue regulations for distributing PPP funds.188 In addressing the second
step, the court determined that the SBA expedited the regulatory
timeline to quickly disburse needed loans and the PPP’s to help
struggling small businesses avoid financial distress, not to relieve
already financially distressed businesses.189 Given those considerations,
the court held the SBA’s bar on bankrupt companies’ receipt of PPP
funding reasonable.190 Finally, on the claim that the SBA’s rule was
arbitrary and capricious, violating 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), the court also
sided with the SBA.191
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